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Price competition under universal service obligations
Axel Gautier∗ and Xavier Wauthy†
In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obli-
gations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market
participant. Universal service obligations are likely to alter firms’ strategic behavior
in such competitive markets. In the present paper, we show that, depending on the
entrant’s market coverage and the degree of product differentiation, the Nash equi-
librium in prices involves either pure or mixed strategies. We show that the pure
strategy market sharing equilibrium, as identified by Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros
(2002), defines a lower bound on the level of equilibrium prices.
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1 Introduction
Universal service obligations go along with the process of deregulation at work in most of
the former public monopoly industries. Several important questions have been addressed
in the published literature. How should we define universal service obligations? What are
the costs of universal service obligations (Panzar 2000) and how should they be financed
(Chone´, Flochel, andPerrot 2002;Mirabel, Poudou, andRoland 2009)?Whichfirms should
be subject to universal service obligations (Hoernig 2006)? In the present paper, we focus
on the implications of universal service obligations for price competition in a deregulated
industry.
Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002) underline the fact that whenever universal service
obligations involve a constraint of uniform pricing, this constraint creates a strategic link
between otherwise segmented markets and induces a less aggressive pricing pattern by the
incumbent. Because prices are strategic complements, equilibrium prices tend to increase
overall and this, in turn, is likely to affect the extent of market coverage by incoming firms.
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Anton, Vander Weide, and Vettas (2002) establish a comparable result under quantity
competition.
The argument is best summarized as follows. Think of a reference industry consisting
of a collection of segmented submarkets (typically, the industry for postal services, with
submarkets corresponding to delivery routes in different geographical areas). Suppose then
that the historical operator is challenged by an entrant on a limited number of submarkets.
Assume further that universal service obligations constraint the incumbent’s behavior: it
must offer its services in all submarkets at a uniform price. At the price competition stage,
the incumbent’s behavior is affected by the extent of the entrant’s market coverage. If the
entrant is a low scale competitor, the incumbent firm is better off setting a price close to the
monopoly price. In this case, it enjoys near monopoly profits on the (relatively numerous)
protected markets but possibly sells very little, or nothing, on the contested markets. If the
entrant covers a larger set of submarkets, the incumbent is better off being more aggressive
over the whole set of submarkets. In which case the profits lost on the protected markets
are compensated by larger sales on the (relatively numerous) contested ones. Hence, by
choosing the number of submarkets it challenges, the entrant controls the aggressiveness of
the incumbent. Prices therefore decrease with the entrant’s coverage (Valletti, Hoernig, and
Barros 2002, lemma 1). For that reason, the entrant will strategically limit its entry scale.
Thepresentpaperbuilds on this lineof argumentbut goes a step further. It is conceivable
indeed that, under universal service obligations, the incumbent decides to withdraw on the
protected markets where it can charge the monopoly price and collect the corresponding
monopoly profits. This strategy is particularly attractive when competition is fierce on
the contested markets (e.g. because products are close substitutes) and insulated markets
are relatively numerous. However, this strategy proves to be quite difficult to sustain in
equilibrium: if the incumbent ‘retreats’ on the insulated markets, the entrant is likely to
price almost as a monopolist on the contested markets, which, in turn, is likely to trigger
an aggressive response by the incumbent. The presence of universal service obligations
therefore tends to destabilize price competition. Formally speaking, taking this strategy
into accountmay destroy the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros
2002; Hoernig 2002).
In this paper,we address precisely this point:wediscuss the existence of the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in the price game when universal service obligations are imposed on one
market participant. In a Hotelling setup, we characterize the price equilibrium under
universal service obligations and identify the range of parameters for which a pure strategy
or a mixed strategy equilibrium, respectively, exists. For a relatively low market coverage
by the entrant, the equilibrium is a quasi-monopoly (pure strategy) equilibrium where the
incumbent retreats on the insulated markets and the entrant monopolizes the contested
markets with a limit price. For a relatively high market coverage, at equilibrium, the
incumbent challenges the entrant on the whole set of contested markets with an aggressive
price. Finally, for intermediate values of the entrant’s coverage, the equilibrium is a mixed
strategy one. Then, we characterize the optimal degree of market coverage by the entrant.
In theHotelling setup, the entrant covers fewermarkets when universal services obligations
are imposed on the incumbent. Moreover, optimal coverage is such that the relevant price
equilibrium is either themixed strategyor thequasi-monopoly equilibrium.Thus, universal
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service obligations unambiguously increase the price on the contested markets while they
donotnecessarily lead to aprice below themonopoly price in theprotectedmarkets. Finally,
in a more general setup, we derive general conditions onmarket coverage and the degree of
product differentiation for the existence of the pure strategy market-sharing equilibrium
considered by Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002).
2 Price competition without universal service obligations
There is a continuum of identical local markets indexed by j , j ∈ [0, N]. Universal service
obligations consist of two constraints: a universal coverage constraint and a uniform price
constraint. If universal service obligations are imposed on the incumbent, firm I , this firm
must serve all the markets at a uniform price, pi . The entrant, firm E, is not constrained by
universal service obligations and serves a subset of the N markets at price pe . Let ne denote
the index of the last market firm E has decided to compete in. The complete set of markets
can, therefore, be decomposed into two subsets: the set [0, ne] of contested markets and
the complement ]ne , N] of insulated ones. Serving a market j ∈ [0, N] involves a fixed
cost g ( j )≥ 0. Markets are ordered in such a way that g ′( j )≥ 0. All operating costs are
normalized to zero.
Firm I and E sell differentiated products and we rely on the linear version of the
Hotelling model to formalize differentiation.1 In each market j ∈ [0, N], consumer’s type
x are uniformly distributed in the [0, 1] interval according to their idiosyncratic taste. The
indirect utility of a consumer’s type x, buying a product k is given by:
U (x)= S − td(x , k)− p,
where d(x , k) is a measure of the distance between the product’s characteristic and type
x’s ideal product. If the consumer does not buy any product, his or her utility is defined as
U (x)= 0. Incidentally, thismeans either that consumers cannot turn to alternativemarkets
where a comparable service would be offered, or that if they can, they are charged a price
that leaves them no surplus. The incumbent offers a product with characteristic x = 0 and
the entrant a product with type x = 1.
In each market, the monopoly payoff is given by π M = p S − pt and this expression is
maximized for p = S2 . We shall assume that St > 2. As a result, the monopoly price on
each market is a corner solution: pm = S − t. The monopoly price leaves the consumer
located at a distance 1 from the monopolist indifferent between buying and not buying.
This assumption is perfectly in line with the literature on Hotelling competition, which
most often assumes full coverage by assuming that S is large enough.2
On the contested markets, standard Hotelling competition takes place, taking ne > 0
as given. Given consumers’ preferences, we may identify the indifferent consumer,
1
In Section 4 we extend the analysis to a more general model of product differentiation.
2
Notice that this assumption ofmonopolymarket coveragemeans that nomarket expansion effect is expected
as a result of competition. All of the market shares gained by the entrant are taken from the incumbent
(the displacement ratio is equal to 1). As shown hereafter, this particular feature of the model reinforces the
strategic value attached by the entrant to a voluntary limitation of the market coverage.
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denoted by x˜ , who separates the firms’ market shares. By definition, he or she solves
S − t x˜ − pi = S − t(1− x˜)− pe . Formally, we obtain
x˜ = t − pi + pe
2t
.
Demands addressed to Firms I and E are then defined as follows:
x Di (pi , pe) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 iff pi ≥ pe + t
x˜ iff pi ∈ [pe − t, pe + t]
1 iff pi ≤ pe − t
(1)
x De (pi , pe) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 iff pe ≥ pi + t
1− x˜ iff pe ∈ [pi − t, pi + t].
1 iff pe ≤ pi − t
(2)
x Dk (.) denotes the duopoly demand addressed to firm k in a contested market and π
D
k (.)
is the corresponding operating profit. Similarly, x M and π M(.) are the monopoly demand
and profit on a monopolized market. Finally, k(.) is the total operating profit of firm k
over the whole set of markets: i = neπ Di + (N − ne)π M and e = neπ De . To obtain the
final payoff of firm k, we must substract from k the fixed cost of serving markets.
When there are no universal service obligations, firms’ optimal behavior can be charac-
terized independently on each local market. We only have to distinguish between contested
and insulated markets, depending on whether the entrant challenges the incumbent. Equi-
librium prices on the contested markets solve:
φ1i (pe) ≡ argmax
pi
pi x˜ = pe + t
2
, (3)
φ1e (pi ) ≡ argmax
pe
pe(1− x˜)= pi + t
2
. (4)
Equilibrium prices p1∗i = t = p1∗e solve (3) and (4). Without universal service obliga-
tions, the Nash equilibrium is, therefore, characterized as follows:
Proposition 1 When the incumbent is not subject to universal service obligations,
(i) Equilibrium prices in the contested markets are given by p1∗i = t = p1∗e .
(ii) The incumbent charges the monopoly price pm = S − t on the insulated markets.
(iii) The entrant’s optimal coverage is given by: n∗e = Min[g − 1( t2 ), N]. The incumbent’s
optimal coverage is n∗i = Min[g − 1(S − t), N].
Notice that whenever g ( j )= 0∀ j ∈ [0, N], both firms cover all markets.3
3
Imposing universal service obligations is relevant when there aremarkets that otherwise would not be served,
that is, when there are unprofitable markets: for some j ∈ [0, N], p such that π M(p)− g ( j )≥ 0.
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3 Price competition with universal service obligations
Whenever the incumbent isnot subject touniversal serviceobligations, its profit is additively
separable between the ne contested markets and the N − ne insulated ones. This explains
why optimal prices do not depend on market coverage in this case. However, this property
does not hold under universal service obligations. The uniform pricing constraint creates
a strategic link between the two types of markets because increasing market shares in the
contested segment by decreasing the price involves an opportunity cost corresponding
to those profits that are lost through this price decrease on the insulated segment. The
characterization of a Nash equilibrium in prices is more involved because of this trade-off.
Under universal service obligations, the incumbent faces a positive demand on the
contested markets only if pi ≤ pe + t. Therefore, the operating profit of firm I is defined as
follows:
i (pi , pe) =
{
(N − ne)pi if pi ≥ pe + t
(N − ne)pi + ne pi x˜ if pi ≤ pe + t.
(5)
Given pe , the incumbent has two options: it may either set a relatively high price such that
it is actually not active on the contested markets and focuses on the protected ones, or it
names an aggressive price and shares contestedmarketswith the entrant. To characterize the
incumbent’s best reply, we need to consider two different strategy profiles, corresponding
to the two branches of themonopoly profit (Equation 5) and compare the resulting payoffs
to formally identify the relevant best reply.




pm = S − t if pe ≤ p˜e








if pe ≥ p˜e
(6)










PROOF: Notice that the payoff function in the lower branch of (5) is not necessarily
concave in own price. There are two candidate price best replies for the incumbent. The
monopoly price pm defined along the first branch of (5) is a first candidate. It ensures the
incumbent to benefit at least from the monopoly profit on the N − ne insulated markets.
Let us define this strategy as the security strategy, because it defines the lowest payoff that
the incumbent can guarantee to itself, whatever the entrant’s strategy; that is, its MinMax
payoff. The second candidate, whichwe call the aggressive pricemaximizes profits along the
second branch of (5). Let us denote this candidate by φi (pe). By definition, it is defined by
argmaxpi (N − ne)pi + ne pi x˜ . Solving the first-order condition along the second branch
of (5) for pi we obtain:
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It then remains to compare the profit obtained by the incumbent, given pe , when
playing either of these two best reply candidates. Intuitively, against a high price from the
entrant, fighting on the contested markets is not too costly in terms of lost monopoly
revenues on the protected markets, whereas the contrary prevails if the entrant’s price is
low. Computations indicate that there exists a critical price p˜e below which the incumbent
prefers to retire on the protected markets and set the monopoly price, and above which the
incumbent sells on both contested and protectedmarkets at a uniform price. By definition,
such a price, p˜e , ensures that when the incumbent optimally replies to that price along
the second branch of (5) (i.e. the incumbent replies aggressively), the resulting payoff is
identical to the payoff obtainedwhen playing the security strategy (i.e. themonopoly payoff
aggregated over the N − ne insulated markets). Formally, p˜e solves
neπ
D
i (φi , p˜e)+ (N − ne)π M(φi )= (N − ne)π M(pm). (8)
Direct computations then yield












Three remarks are in order at this stage. First, in subgames where the coverage is close
to zero, the price defined by φi (.) tends to increase exponentially. In this case, consumers
stop buying and the demand is no longer equal to x˜ . Hence, the corresponding best reply
must be computed as the solution to U (x˜)= 0, which is relevant against the highest values
of pe . Second, whenever the entrant does not cover all markets (ne < N), the incumbent
is less aggressive on the contested markets compared to the case without universal service
obligations: φi (.)>φ1i (.). Moreover,
∂φi
∂ne
> 0. These results are well-known from Valletti,
Hoernig, and Barros (2002). Finally, and more importantly, the best reply correspondence
exhibits a downward jump at p˜e : φi ( p˜e)< pm.
The profit realized by the entrant when it challenges ne markets is given by:
e(pi , pe) =
{
ne pe if pe ≤ pi − t
ne pe(1− x˜) if pe ≥ pi − t
. (9)
Because the incumbentmay choose to set themonopoly price as an optimal strategy, we
must consider the possibility that the entrant excludes the incumbent from the contested
markets by setting a limit price. This price maximizes profits along the first branch of the
above equation. Because the payoff is strictly increasing along this branch, we may define
this limit price as:
pLe (pi )= pi − t.
The entrant’s optimal behavior is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The best reply function of the entrant is given by the following equation:
BRe(pi )= Max
[
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Figure 1 Quasi-monopoly pure strategy equilibrium.
PROOF: There are two best reply candidates for the entrant: the limit price pLe (pi ) and the
profit-maximizing price defined along the second branch of the profit function. This latter
candidate is identical to the price maximizer without universal service obligations and is
given by (4). Notice that the entrant’s profit function is concave in own price; therefore,
there exists a unique best reply that is defined by the maximum of the two candidates pLe
or φ1e (.). 
3.1 Equilibrium analysis
Depending on the entrant’s coverage, there are three possible and mutually exclusive equi-
librium configurations: two pure strategy equilibrium and a mixed strategy equilibrium.
We consider each of them in turn.
Quasi-Monopoly Pure Strategy Equilibrium The first candidate is defined by
(pm = S − t, pLe (pm)= S − 2t). The incumbent monopolizes the protected markets and
the entrant monopolizes the challenged markets with a limit price. This equilibrium is
depicted in Figure 1. The entrant’s best reply exhibits a kink for the pair of prices where the
non-negativity constraint on x Di (.) becomes binding. Our equilibrium candidate lies above
this kink.Anecessary condition for this candidate tobeavalidone is thatφi (S − 2t)≥ S − t;
that is, the best reply defined by (7) against pe = S − 2t is above the monopoly price.
This condition is satisfied whenever ne ≤ n−e ≡ 2t NS + t . A second necessary condition is that
φ1e (S − t)≤ S − 2t; that is, the entrant’s best reply against S − t is not defined by the inte-
rior solution. This condition is satisfied whenever S ≥ 4t. When these two conditions are
satisfied, (S − t, S − 2t) defines the unique Nash equilibrium.4
4
This equilibrium may exist because the monopoly price pm is a corner solution.
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Figure 2 Market sharing pure strategy equilibrium.
Market Sharing Pure Strategy Equilibrium The second candidate equilibrium in pure



















Such an equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2. For this equilibrium to exist, it is necessary
that the downward jump in firm I ’s best reply, as identified in Lemma 1, takes place for
a low value of pe . More precisely, this equilibrium applies whenever p∗e ≥ p˜e , as depicted
in Figure 2. Formally, this inequality defines a critical number of local markets, n+e , above







N2(S − t)(− 3+ 3S − t(7+ t))+ N(9+ 18S − t(18+ t)))
9+ 72S + (− 78+ t)t ,
withn−e < n
+
e .An interesting featureof this equilibriumis that p
∗
k decreasewith the entrant’s
coverage and converge to p1∗k as the entrant reaches full coverage.
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium For intermediate values of ne ∈ [n−e , n+e ] no pure strat-
egy equilibrium exists. However, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists because payoffs are
continuous.
Referring to Figure 3, we observe that p∗e < p˜e . Therefore, there exists no intersection
between the firms’ best replies, hence no pure strategy equilibrium. There exists, however,
one natural candidate, mixed strategy equilibrium to consider. Firm I , which has a discon-
tinuous best reply, randomizes over two prices, which are the two possible values of B Ri at
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Figure 3 Mixed strategy equilibrium.
the point of discontinuity. That is, firm I chooses pm with probability α and φi ( p˜e) with
probability (1−α). The probability α is chosen to ensure that playing the pure strategy p˜e




m, pe)+ (1−α)π De (φi , pe)= p˜e . (13)
Summing up, we have established the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Under universal service obligations, one of the following mutually exclusive
equilibrium applies:
• The incumbent sets the monopoly price pm, while the entrant sets a limit price pLe (pm) such
that it is the only active firm on the contested markets. This equilibrium prevails whenever
ne ∈ [0, n−e ].
• For intermediate values ne ∈ [n−e , n+e ], a mixed strategy equilibrium prevails: the incumbent
names pm with probability α (defined by Equation 13) and φi ( p˜e)with probability (1−α);
the entrant plays the pure strategy p˜e .
• Whenever ne ∈ [n+e , N], a pure strategy equilibrium exists where the incumbent names p∗i
and the entrant names p∗e . Firms share the contested markets.
3.2 Optimal coverage by the entrant
Because they alter equilibrium prices in the contested markets, universal service obliga-
tions also affect the entrant’s payoffs, hence entry behavior. From equilibrium payoffs in
the pricing game, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium prices and the profit
5
To the best of our knowledge, the structure of this equilibrium is analyzed first by Krishna (1989) and is
developed further in various contexts. See, for instance, Boccard and Wauthy (2003) for an application in
the context of a Hotelling model.
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obtained by the entrant in each covered market are weakly decreasing in ne (and strictly
decreasing for ne ≥ n−e ). Therefore, the entrant has strategic reasons to limit its market
coverage (Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros 2002). The following proposition establishes that,
when coverage is endogenous and when there are no fixed costs of serving markets, the
optimal coverage is such that the resulting price equilibrium is the mixed strategy equilib-
rium. If serving markets is costly, it will decrease further the entrant’s coverage. Hence, in
our example where local markets are represented by a Hotelling line, the interior “market
sharing” equilibrium is never the relevant one.
Proposition 3 (i) The optimal coverage by the entrant n∗e is smaller than n
+
e . (ii) If
g ( j )= 0∀ j ∈ [0, N], then n∗e ∈ [n−e , n+e ].
PROOF: Consider first that g ( j )= 0∀ j ∈ [0, N].Wehave: (i) forne ∈ [0, n−e ], the entrant’s
profit ne(S − 2t) is strictly increasing in ne ; (ii) for ne ∈ [n+e , N], the entrant’s profit
ne p∗e (1− x˜) is strictly decreasing in ne ; and (iii) The entrant’s payoff is continuous in ne .
In particular, we have limne→n+e α = 0 (because at n+e , p∗e = p˜e) and limne→n−e φi ( p˜e)= pm.
Therefore, the highest payoff will be reached for ne in [n−e , n
+
e ]. Finally, when market
coverage is costly and g ′( j )> 0, coverage will be reduced further. 
Our findings can be illustrated with the help of a numerical example. Consider for
instance that N = 1, S = 5, t = 1 and g ( j )= 0, ∀ j . Numerical computations yield the fol-
lowingoutcomes:n−e  0, 33, n+e  0, 83 andn∗e  0.45. Inotherwords, the entrant covers
approximately 45 percent of the markets. Because g ( j )= 0, ∀ j , the entrant would have
covered 100 percent of the markets without universal service obligations.
In the present setup, the strategic effect of limited coverage is particularly neat. When
limiting its market coverage, the entrant relaxes price competition; this positively affects
local profits and, therefore, possibly compensates for the smaller number of covered mar-
kets. However, the equilibrium price differential between the incumbent and the entrant
also increases. Because the displacement ratio is equal to 1 (i.e. the market is fully covered),
this implies that firm E’s market share increases in all of the contestedmarkets. This second
effect clearly pushes incentives towards a more limited coverage.
3.3 Price equilibrium and optimal coverage with and without universal
service obligations
In this section we compare the nature of equilibrium depending on whether universal
service obligations apply or not. Universal service obligations change the nature of price
competitionbecause theycreatea strategic linkbetween themarkets that arecontestedby the
entrant, [0, ne], and those that are shielded from competition, ]ne , N]. This strategic link
has the following consequences on the incumbent’s pricing behavior. First, the incumbent
has the option to withdraw from the protectedmarket, leaving the contestedmarkets to the
entrant. Second, if it decides to compete on the whole set of markets, it is less aggressive in
the price game because any price decrease that would induce higher profits in the contested
markets goes along with a profit reduction in the protected ones. As a result, whatever
the entrant’s price, the incumbent’s best reply necessarily involves a higher price under
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universal obligations than without them whenever the set of protected markets is non-
empty (compare Equation 6 with Equation 4). As for the entrant, its best reply is invariant
to the presence of universal service obligations, except for the fact that the entrantmight use
a limit price, and if it does so, its price is strictly higher with universal service obligations.
Consequently, equilibrium prices on the contestedmarkets must be higher under universal
service obligations. This property is obviously satisfied in the mixed strategy equilibrium
because in such an equilibrium the lower boundof the incumbent’s price is precisely defined
by φi ( p˜e)>φ1i ( p˜e).
Summing up, if we compare the market outcome with and without universal service
obligations, we can conclude that, with universal service obligations:
1. Prices are strictly higher on the contested markets.
2. Prices are not necessarily lower on the protected markets.
3. The incumbent has a higher coverage and the entrant may have a higher or a lower
coverage.
The incumbent’s higher coverage is a direct consequence of the universal coverage
constraint. For the entrant, the impactofuniversal serviceobligationsoncoverage is actually
twofold. The entrant realizes a higher profit on each covered market and this stimulates
market expansion. At the same time, the entrant has strategic reasons to limit its coverage
in order to maintain higher prices. The impact of universal service obligations on the
entrant’s coverage depends on the relative importance of these two effects. In the particular
case where g ( j )= 0, ∀ j ∈ [0, N], market coverage is strictly lower (Proposition 3).
These conclusions echo those of Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002), who consider a
similar problem but with a focus on the “market sharing” pure strategy equilibrium.6 As we
have just shown, this equilibrium might not be a valid candidate in the Hotelling context.
In the next section we attempt to generalize the approach. In particular, we study how the
existence of themarket sharing pure strategy equilibriumdepends on the degree of product
differentiation and on the entrant’s coverage.
4 Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium: The general case
We assume that firm I and E sell differentiated products; they compete simultaneously
in prices, taking ne > 0 as given. Production costs are normalized to zero. x Dk (pi , pe) and
x M(p) are assumed to be well behaved. In particular, there exists a unique well-defined






The only qualitative difference with their paper pertains to the evolution of the price on the insulatedmarkets
that unambiguously decreases in the market sharing equilibrium but not in the other two equilibrium
configurations.
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φ1k (p j ) ≡ argmax
pk
π Dk (pk , p j ). (15)
Without universal service obligations, the monopoly price pm prevails on the insulated
markets and equilibrium prices (p1∗i , p
1∗
e ) apply on the contested markets.
Withuniversal service obligations, firm I ’sMinMaxpayoff is equal to (N − ne)π M(pm).
Let us then denote by pˆi (pe) the solution to equation x Di ( pˆi , pe)= 0; that is, pˆi (pe) defines
the critical price above which the incumbent faces no demand on the contested markets.
Then, given pe , the payoff of the incumbent is formally defined by:
i (pi , pe) =
{
(N − ne)π M(pi )+ neπ Di (pi , pe) if pi ≤ pˆi (pe)
(N − ne)π M(pi ) if pi ≥ pˆi (pe)
. (16)
There are two local maximizers:
• φi (.) along the first branch of (15) and
• pm along the second branch of (15).
The extent to which the first maximizer dominates the second one obviously depends
on the extent of market coverage; that is, on ne . More fundamentally, the lack of concavity
is likely to destroy the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Notice that a sufficient
condition ensuring that this lack of concavity is not problematic consists in assuming that
x Di (p
m, 0)> 0. In this case, the non-negativity constraint cannot be binding in the relevant
domain of prices because firm I will never quote a price above the monopoly price while
firm E will not sell at a loss.7
To characterize firm I ’s best reply, we must compare the payoffs along the two profiles:
neπ
D
i (φi (pe), pe)+ (N − ne)π M(φi (pe))= (N − ne)π M(pm), (17)
which can be rewritten as follows:
ne
N − ne π
D
i (φi (pe), pe)+π M(φi (pe))=π M(pm).
Because of strategic complementarity, the left-hand side of the equation is continuous and
strictly increasing in pe in the relevant domain, whereas the right-hand side is constant.
Moreover, π M(φi )≤π M(pm). Accordingly, there exists at most one solution to the above
equation. Let us denote this solution by p˜e . The incumbent’s best reply correspondence,
therefore, writes as follows:
B Ri (pe) =
{
pm if pe ≤ p˜e
φi (pe) if pe ≥ p˜e
. (18)
Because pm >φi ( p˜e), the best reply correspondence exhibits a downward discontinuity
at p˜e .
7
Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002) implicitly assume that this condition is satisfied, which indeed can be
interpreted as putting a lower bound on the degree of product differentiation.
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As for the entrant’s behavior, two strategy profiles are a priori possible. The entrant
can either compete with the incumbent on all contested markets or choose to quote a limit
price. The first strategy corresponds to pe =φ1e (pi ) and the second one to a limit price
pLe defined as the solution of x
D
i (pi , pe)= 0. The second strategy applies whenever the
non-negativity constraint is binding for firm I at prices φ1e (pi ). Therefore, the entrant’s
best reply function is kinked and defined as:
BRe(pi )= Max
[





There are a priori two pure strategy equilibrium candidates: the market sharing pure
strategy equilibrium and the quasi-monopoly pure strategy equilibrium. It is immediate to
establish that the second candidate can be ruled out whenever the equilibrium monopoly
price is interior; that is, whenever the monopoly payoff function is differentiable at pm.8 In
this case, at pm, the derivative of the payoffs on the insulated markets is zero, whereas it is
strictly negative on the contested ones. As a consequence, firm I ’s best replymust beφi (pLe ).
We are then left with a unique interior pure strategy equilibrium candidate. Because firm I ’s
best reply is discontinuous, this equilibriummight not be a valid candidate either. Lemma 3
summarizes the structure of the price equilibrium under universal service obligations. The
first part of Lemma 3 (non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium) follows from the
discontinuity in I ’s best reply, whereas the second part (existence of a mixed strategy
equilibrium) follows from the payoffs’ continuity (Glicksberg 1952).
Lemma 3 Whenever p∗e < p˜e the Market Sharing Pure Strategy Equilibrium does not exist.
When this equilibrium does not exist, there always exists a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Moreover, average prices in a mixed strategy equilibrium are strictly above the pure
strategy ones. Having described the structure of the price equilibrium, we now concentrate
on the economic conditions under which the market sharing pure strategy equilibrium
exists. This question is prompted by Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002) who exclusively
focus on that equilibrium. The answer depends on the entrant’s market coverage and the
degree of product differentiation. When products are sufficiently differentiated, the pure
strategy equilibrium exists (Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros 2002; Hoernig 2006) while, for
homogenous products, the unique equilibrium is themixed strategy equilibriumwhenever
the incumbent has a strictly positive MinMax payoff (Hoernig 2002).
Let us measure product differentiation by a parameter δ ∈ [δ, δ]. The lower bound
corresponds to homogeneous products and the higher bound to independent demands.We
already established that a pure strategy equilibrium always exists whenever x Di (p
m, 0)> 0,
which implicitly defines a bound on δ above which existence is nonproblematic. The
following proposition characterizes the type of equilibrium prevailing for each possible
value of δ and ne .
Proposition 4 (i) For each ne ∈ (0, N), there exists a degree of product differentiation δ˜ < δ
such that for δ ≤ δ˜, the Market Sharing Pure Strategy Equilibrium fails to exist . (ii) δ˜ is
decreasing in ne .
8
This condition is not satisfied in the Hotelling setup developed in the previous section.
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Figure 4 Equilibrium type in the price game.
PROOF: The pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist whenever p∗e ≤ p˜e . Consider any given
ne ∈ (0, N). When the degree of product differentiation, δ, varies, the equilibrium and the




> 0 and ∂ p˜e
∂δ
< 0.Moreover,whenproducts are
almost homogeneous, we have p∗e < p˜e : limδ→δ p
∗
e = 0 and limδ→δ p˜e > 0. Combined with
the fact that whenever x Di (p
m, 0)> 0 the corresponding equilibrium is the pure strategy
equilibrium, we have proven part (i).
We have thus identified a locus δ˜(ne) characterized by p∗e (δ˜(ne), ne)= p˜e(δ˜(ne), ne).
For a given δ, when ne > δ˜− 1(ne), the corresponding equilibrium is the pure strat-
egy equilibrium. As a matter of fact, both p∗e and p˜e are decreasing in ne and
limne→N p
∗
e = p∗1e > limne→N p˜e = pLe (pm)). Therefore, for a given δ, the mixed strat-
egy equilibrium applies for the lowest coverage and the pure strategy equilibrium for the
highest coverage. This proves that the locus δ˜(ne) is decreasing in ne . 
Proposition 4 associates to all possible degrees of product differentiation and possible
coverages the corresponding equilibrium type in the price game. Figure 4 illustrates the
proposition. The pure strategy equilibrium does not exist when the incumbent’s MinMax
payoff is high (low coverage by the entrant) and when competition is fierce (little product
differentiation). In addition, when the coverage increases (and, therefore, the incumbent’s
MinMax payoff decreases), it is possible to sustain the pure strategy equilibrium for more
homogeneous products.
5 Final remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed the impact of universal service obligations on the intensity
of price competition and on the extent of market coverage by the entrant. Previous papers,
most notably Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002), emphasize the strategic link that results
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from the imposition of universal service obligations on the incumbent firm: universal
service obligations weaken price competition because they penalize the incumbent from
fighting in the contested markets through the monopoly revenues lost on the protected
markets. The entrant, in turn, might benefit from this strategic link by controlling for
the incumbent’s aggressiveness through its own choice of market coverage. We push this
intuition to its end by showing that, under low market coverage, the willingness to retreat
in the protected markets actually leads to the non-existence of an equilibrium (in pure
strategies).9 We show that this problem is almost a generic one: whatever the extent of
market coverage, there exist products’ characteristics for which the non-existence problem
arises. We also show that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, prices are higher, on average.
As a consequence, neglecting the existence of these mixed strategy equilibrium amounts to
underestimate the anticompetitive consequences of universal service obligations.
Universal service obligations typically constrain the incumbent to offer its products
for sale in all segments of the market. Obviously, however, it may happen that the price
differential is so large that the incumbent faces no demand at all on the contested markets.
In any industry where such a configuration makes sense, our analysis is relevant. Such
market configurations are expected to prevail with homogeneous products, for vertically
differentiatedproducts andhorizontal products.10 Moreover, the examplewedevelop, based
on a Hotelling framework, relies on a unit demand setup. This setup essentially describes
a market where consumers rely on a unique provider, in which they possibly buy several
units; that is, a market where benefiting from the service requires a form of affiliation
and where there is no real benefit to be obtained from being registered to multiple service
providers. Needless to say, this is a reasonable description of markets for postal services,
energy provision and telecoms, for instance. These models are the most prone to generate
the “higher price” mixed strategy equilibrium we identify as a consequence of universal
service obligations.
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